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1 - Introduction1 
 
The numerous, contradictory analyses made of ongoing socio-economic 
changes, for which the expression globalization has been widely accepted, 
can be grouped together under two fundamental arguments. One argument 
seeks to detect a new economic age in these processes of change, 
identifying its distinctive features and even building a theory of its dynamics. 
The other argument is that globalisation, in the form that it is understood by 
the first group, is actually a myth. Both arguments naturally have their strong 
and weak points. 
Seen from a historical perspective, the strength of the first argument lies 
in the way it stresses the importance of supranational spaces, and in 
particular the world economy, as a relevant space for socio-economic 
analysis, whereas the strength of the second argument lies in the 
comparative analysis that it makes of two historical periods separated by 
almost an entire century: the final decades of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. 
This paper seeks to improve on the analysis of continuity and disruption 
in the historical process by attempting to answer the question: «What is new 
about the globalisation process?" In order to do this, we shall first identify 
the most generally accepted features of this process and then attempt to 
break down the question into what would seem to be relevant sub-questions 
in this context:   
Does globalisation represent a new economic age? Does it imply 
relevant economic spaces? Does it imply a new economic system? 
                                            




Is globalisation a new phase of modern economic growth (MEG) [Kuznets 
(1966)]? Does it imply a new international economic order? 
 
2 - The globalisation process 
 
For the purposes of our analysis, it would be useful to summarise the main 
trends in the globalisation process and not just accept its narrowest meaning or 
most visible outcome: the growing integration of the national economies that 
together comprise the contemporary world economy.  
Looking at matters from what is naturally an economic viewpoint, but not 
forgetting that we are dealing with something that must be seen as a total social 
reality, we can say that it is fairly widely accepted that the following mutually 
interdependent trends in social change can be identified in technological, 
organisational, institutional and spatial terms: 
(i) The ever faster introduction of technological innovations, particularly the 
developments taking place in the area of information technology, optical 
fibres and miniaturisation, notably greater access and integration into the 
information network. Equally important innovations have taken place in the 
field of energy production, particularly with the development of 
biotechnology, the biomass and superconductors, although the spread of 
these has been relatively slow. The impact of such innovations has been 
felt through the rapid decrease in both general costs and transaction and 
information costs in particular; 
(ii) The move towards smaller and more flexible production systems, on the 
one hand, and greater recourse to external supplies, on the other hand. 
Such innovations are designed to combine the advantages of mass 
production, based on the so-called Taylorist-Fordist model (velocity and low 
unit costs), with the advantages of handycraft (quality and product 
differentiation), through the continuous introduction of innovations, making 
better use of the knowledge and creativity of the productive system and 
reducing bureaucracy in favour of market mechanisms as a means of 




(iii) The change in the way the economy is organised and operates, leading to a 
greater predominance of market forces and private enterprise, in keeping 
with liberal ideology. This change, which clearly affects the role played by 
the state in the economy, is designed to increase productive efficiency and 
encourage innovation. Two effects are particularly noticeable in this 
process of change, both of which have a markedly social component: the 
greater flexibility of the labour market and the reduced supply not only of 
social services, but also, as a result of technological innovations, of some 
of the goods that until quite recently were considered to be public or quasi-
public from a technical viewpoint;  
(iv) The change in the way the political system is organised and operates, with 
the greater spread of liberal democracy. This process does, in fact, run 
parallel to the economic process mentioned above, in which the market is 
considered to be the most democratic form of expression of the needs and 
wishes of society. The social consequences of this are quite significant and 
contradictory: the reduction and alteration in the means of social control 
encourages greater social participation but it also increases the possibility 
of new divisions and social conflicts, often of ethnic and cultural nature. 
This is a trend that has been encouraged, amongst other factors, by the 
greater accessibility and lower cost of information technologies which, 
since they are free of any effective control, escape the kind of infernal 
censorship typically imposed by repressive regimes;  
(v) The change in the economic space, with the increasing integration of 
national markets in production factors, goods and services and a greater 
homogeneity in cultural patterns, particularly the patterns of consumption, 
based on the role played by companies with productive systems operating 
in different national spaces and, naturally, as a consequence of the 
technological, organisational and institutional innovations that have been 
summarised here. 
 
3 - Does globalisation represent a new economic age? 
 
This question relates to the identification of a possibly new economic 
age beginning some 10-15 years ago, i. e. the so-called global era, and 
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involves discovering whether, in its basic aspects, the age of MEG, which 
first began roughly 200 years ago, has been dismantled and is being 
replaced by new structures and operating patterns that may come to 
represent a distinct process in the long run. 
Very briefly, the main distinguishing features of this economic age in 
relation to earlier ones are: 
(i) The rapid and sustained increase in the average standard of living;  
(ii) A modern economic structure characterised by industrialisation and 
tertiarisation processes;  
(iii) The formation of relevant new economic spaces: national economies 
and the contemporary world economy;  
(iv) The predominance of the capitalist market economy as a means of 
organising and operating the economy. 
 
3.1 - The rapid and sustained increase in the average standard of living  
In the age of MEG, the rapid and sustained increase in the average 
standard of living is considered to derive from the significant increase in the 
productivity of economic resources, largely as a result of technological, 
organisational, institutional and geographical innovations. Such innovations are, in 
turn, a consequence, more than anything else, of the systematic application of 
scientific knowledge, in its broadest possible sense, to the economic activities of 
production. 
It does not seem possible to deny that this has become a permanent feature of 
our modern day and age, nor is it possible to envisage any decisive change in this 
pattern in either the short or medium term, although some evolution can be 
expected in the meaning of the term standard of living.  
In fact, even allowing for the impossibility of guaranteeing the continuing growth 
in the standard of living in strictly quantitative terms [Nunes & Valerio (1997, 236--
241)] there is still no sign of any real belief that the cultural patterns of humankind 
are inevitably bound to change, with less priority being given to increased 
consumption. Besides the inherent sluggishness of changes in cultural structures, 
two extra-cultural factors have contributed to this continuity: on the one hand, the 
tendency, albeit slow, for MEG to spread into areas that have not yet entered into 
this new age, which, as historical experience clearly shows, will result in a more or 
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less rapid increase in the levels of consumption of material goods in these areas; 
on the other hand, the effect of the most recent innovations in the field of 
communications, namely in the mass media and particularly in the area of 
television linked to video and satellite networks, but also in terms of the Internet 
and even in relation to strictly private forms of communication, such as the 
telephone, which have promoted and created expectations of highly diversified 
patterns of consumption.  
It should also be noted that the increasing awareness of the environmental and 
social problems inherent in current patterns of consumption, particularly the 
external diseconomies inherent in economic activity, has not yet had any significant 
repercussions in terms of alterations to social accounting. The most commonly used 
indicators of the average standard of living continue to be based on the traditional 
assessment of GDP or its equivalent. Of those attempts that have been made to 
construct indices of progress and social welfare, some of which are already quite 
old [Sklair (1995, 21-23)] and inherently contain a less strictly quantitative concept 
of the standard of living or quality of life, only the UN's index of human 
development, which involves no more than three indicators, has been used to any 
real extent. Rather than bringing about any changes in cultural aspects, the 
worsening of these problems will tend to encourage innovation with the aim of 
substituting and saving polluting energy forms and materials, without this having 
any notable repercussions on the growth rates of GDP per capita or any other 
indicator of social welfare.  
Finally, there is no need for us to demonstrate or exemplify the fact that 
worldwide growth in the levels of GDP and average consumption continues to 
depend on the application of science to economic activity, through innovations that 
create new goods and services or reduce the cost of others, thereby increasing and 
spreading consumer demand for them. As has been the case for the past 200 
years, increases in GDP per capita continue to be the result, more than anything 
else, of an improvement in the quality of the factors of production [Maddison (1995, 
ch. 2)]. The phase of mass consumption first heralded in the USA in the 1920's 






3.2 - The economic structure 
  
The alteration to the economic structure that has been inherent in the 
more successful processes of MEG, particularly in so far as the sectoral 
composition of economic activity and the sectoral use of productive resources are 
concerned, can be clearly seen by the fact that the economy has begun to obtain 
most of its product and invest most of its resources in manufacturing industries in 
the broadest sense of the term (including transport and communications [Kuznets 
(1971)] and services. Typically, the first phases of MEG witnessed a rapid growth 
in manufacturing activities, whilst recent decades have been characterised by a 
gradual process of tertiarisation. The causes of such a process of evolution are, on 
the one hand, the alterations taking place in the pattern of demand associated 
with an increase in the average standard of living and the different demand-
income elasticities for the various goods and services, and, on the other hand, the 
different sectoral incidence of innovations.  
The last few decades clearly show that there has been a continuing 
accentuation of this trend, namely the rapid growth in the relative importance of 
services. Such a shift now occurs not only In detriment to the agricultural sector 
(which had the largest increases in productivity in the post-war period), but also in 
detriment to the secondary sector, and the explanations for this phenomenon 
remain perfectly valid [Maddison (1991, 73-74)]. In fact, until the Second World 
War at least, technical progress was much more rapid in the sectors that produced 
goods rather than those that produced services, where productivity levels 
consequently tended to remain relatively low. This aspect justifies the fact that 
already during the inter-war period there was a tendency for the tertiary sector to 
outscore the secondary sector in terms of employment structure, namely with 
there being a greater share of the active population employed In services [Kuznets 
(1971, 249-258) and Maddison (1995, 38)]. It should, however, be noted that in 
the overwhelming majority of OECD countries a major share of the GDP was 
already being produced by the tertiary sector (more than 50%) as early as 1970 
[OECD (1998)]. Naturally, the point at which the economic structure begins to 
change varies from national economy to national economy and the way in which 
the subsectors, particularly transport and communications, are classified affects 
the precise identification of these decisive moments.  
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The apparent difficulty that the developed countries have had in replacing 
labour with capital in the services sector has only been overcome with the latest 
wave of innovations, and, in regard to organisational aspects, because of the 
sector's technical characteristics (the need for simultaneous production and 
consumption), this restructuring is also linked to the process of deregulation and 
privatisation first begun almost two decades ago, as well as to the continuing 
internationalisation or globalisation of productive structures. It should be noted 
that the changes in the organisation of the productive system, which we referred 
to in the first section, also meant that certain services that were traditionally 
accounted for in the industrial sector (since they were in fact provided by industrial 
companies) began to be accounted for in the tertiary sector, because they were 
subcontracted out to specialist companies, thereby causing these trends to 
develop even faster.  
On the other hand, it should be noted that one of the indicators in which 
the intensification of these processes of integration is most evident is that of 
direct foreign investment (DFI) linked to the activities of multinational or 
transnational companies. As is shown by Adda (1997 I, 120-121), if the first wave 
of DFI was fundamentally directed at the exploitation of raw materials and the 
second postwar wave was fundamentally aimed at the industrial sector, the 
current wave of investment is directed in particular at the services sector, which is 
responsible for the exceptionally rapid growth in these flows of investment [The 
Economist (18-10-1997)]. According to the former author, because of the 
technical characteristics of services, competing in this area internationally 
requires setting up companies in the respective markets, an action which has in 
fact been made possible through the rapid reduction in state monopolies in 
sectors such as electricity, water, telecommunications, air transport, banking and 
insurance. Traditionally private activities, frequently linked to multinational 
companies, such as advertising companies, consultancy firms, travel agencies, 
hotel and catering businesses or the media (news agencies, TV networks) have 
also expanded in this same context.  
Whilst it seems undeniable that a significant increase in demand was 
brought about by the sharp fall in the prices of services2 as a result of the impact 
                                            
2 Using data provided by the World Bank and the IMF as its source, The Economist (18-10-97) mentions that between 1975 
and 1995 the cost of processing information by computer technology fell at a rate of roughly 30% per year in real terms, and 
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of different innovations and their rapid spread throughout this sector (including 
the emergence of new products), it also seems clear that the demand-income 
elasticity of services such as entertainment, tourism, education, information, 
savings management, etc., is positive. 
 
3.3 - The relevant new economic spaces 
 
The age of MEG has led to the creation and consolidation of new economic 
spaces, namely the contemporary world economy and the national economies. 
 
3.3.1 - The contemporary world economy 
 
As was said earlier, the strictest meaning given to the term globalisation is 
that of an increasing integration of the national societies and economies that 
together make up the contemporary world economy.  
Strictly speaking, the evolution of humanity over the very long term may he 
seen as a process involving the creation and progressive expansion of global 
spaces, i. e. spaces that are self-sufficient in terms of fulfilling basic social 
functions. In relation to the economic function, it is possible to talk of global 
economies in the sense of self-sufficiency in terms of essential goods (both 
resources and final products). Such self-sufficiency is achieved through the 
interdependence of economic units that is itself based on degrees of specialisation 
of greater or lesser complexity, whether in terms of sectors (local economies) and 
regions (world-economies), and on forms of competition that can similarly be of 
greater or lesser complexity.  
Until roughly 200 years ago, there existed various spaces with these 
characteristics. These then grew slowly in demographic and economic terms, 
experiencing recessions and, in some cases, disintegrating or being integrated into 
more complex types of spaces: the world-economies [Braudel (1989)]. Such 
evolution was compatible with traditional societies and economies characterized, 
amongst other things, by the low incidence and irregularity of innovations. Since 
then, the application of science to economic activity has given rise to a new 
                                                                                                          
that in 1996 the price of a 3-minute telephone call between London and New York cost only $1 as opposed to $300 in 1930, 




economic age (MEG) in which modern societies and economies have created the 
conditions necessary for the formation of one single space with these 
characteristics, the contemporary world economy, as the single global space 
existing at the level of the planet itself. This process, which was essentially 
completed at the end of the nineteenth century, thanks to the innovations 
introduced in several sectors of activity, and particularly in transport and 
communications, corresponds to a period of acceleration, expansion and 
intensification in the economic relations between the different economic spaces 
existing in the world.  
Thus, the major disruption in terms of global economic spaces involved a 
change from a situation in which there existed several global spaces to a situation 
in which there was only one space with this characteristic. In fact such a change 
occurred at the turn of the last century. It should be noted that the changes that 
have been taking place as we draw towards the end of this century, namely the 
greater integration of the centrally managed socialist economies and the heavily 
pro-market strategies of the new industrial countries, have not essentially altered 
the situation that was created at that time. The earth's orbital space stations and 
the physical accessibility of other planets do not yet represent the formation of new 
economic spaces, nor are they expected to do so in the short or medium term, not 
even if they should come to be integrated into an extra-terrestrial world-economy. 
We shall return to this question in section 4.2. 
 
3.3.2 — The national economies  
 
The contemporary world economy is composed of several partial 
economies, which are not in themselves self-sufficient in terms of essential goods, 
and which, through the process of MEG have come to represent a specific type of 
economy that is most commonly referred to as a national economy. In simple 
terms, a national economy is characterized by the unity and specificity of its 
economic system - which makes it a customs space, a monetary space, a fiscal 
space and a legal space - and of its economic policy - which makes it a political 
space [Nunes & Valério (1995, 47) and Valério (1996, 11-13)].  
How should the changes that are taking place at the end of this century be 
seen in such a context?  
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There are three aspects that are normally highlighted as being essential 
features of the global era: the intensification of the economic integration of 
national spaces at a worldwide level, the global logic of productive systems and 
the limits imposed on the use of the traditional instruments of economic policy by 
national economies and states. The question therefore involves discovering 
whether this process is causing national spaces to disappear as relevant 
economic spaces and also whether, in more concrete terms, these spaces no 
longer represent political spaces. We shall deal with the first of these three 
aspects in this section and the second and third aspects in section 3.4.  
As far as the first aspect is concerned, it has already been stressed that the 
real qualitative leap forward occurred roughly a century ago when the technical 
and institutional means then available led to the formation of genuine national 
economies, whilst at the same time making it possible for them to create the 
contemporary world economy [Foreman-Peck (1995, ch. 6-9)].  
Yet, even the identification at the end of this century of a conspicuous 
quantitative increase in the flows of factors and goods between national 
economies remains a source of some controversy. A great deal of empirical 
evidence has been gathered together for the analysis of this question [Hirst & 
Thompson (1996), Bairoch (1997) and The Economist (18-10-97 and foil.)]. There 
would be no point here in our simply restating the question, but it can be said in a 
very general and summary fashion that, in absolute terms, the figures show a 
significant increase in the rate of these flows and an equally significant decrease 
in the national control over the movement of final goods and resources (except, in 
the case of this latter aspect, for labour)3.  
However, in relative terms, namely when flows are measured against 
national products or population size, the general conclusions are much less 
spectacular, with the result that it is possible to see lower levels of integration m 
                                            
3 This intensification does, however, vary quite sharply depending on the respective economy and type of goods involved. In 
the case of trade in goods in worldwide terms, there has been little notable fluctuation in its overall behaviour, with it 
continuing to follow a trend that, strictly speaking, started at the beginning of the 1950's, both in value and in terms of 
economic policies. In the case of resources, however, fluctuations have been much greater in reaction to the crises provoked 
by external shocks. As far as migrations are concerned, although immigration increased slightly during the 1980's and at the 
beginning of the 1990's, despite the strict controls exercised by most European countries and the USA in response to the 
recession in the 1970's, such flows have clearly slowed down as a result of the greater restrictions introduced in recent years 
in most developed countries, so that there has in fact been a fall in the proportion of immigrants in the total population. In the 
case of financial flows, there has been a particularly rapid increase and mobility in this area over the last ten years. This  is due 
to the fact that it is in this area that technological, organisational and institutional innovations have had the greatest impact, 
most precisely in the form of telecommunications via satellite and the greater spread of information technology, the greater 
specialisation of financial and capital markets and the widespread removal of controls over the movement of capital, first 
introduced in England in 1979. 
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the world economy, or rates that are just beginning to recover in relation to the 
beginning of the century4.  
It should be added that, as we near the end of this century, the 
globalisation process, which has been claimed to involve the gradual 
disappearance of national spaces, has been accompanied by parallel and similarly 
intense processes of regional economic integration, of varying degrees of formality 
and incorrectly described as reflecting a régionalisation process, an aspect that 
will also be dealt with later in section 4.2. This whole process has consisted of the 
setting up of spaces tending to take on the characteristics of a national economy 
and comprising several national states. Not only has their formation run parallel to 
the intensification of the globalisation process, but they have also been an 
important contributory factor in this same process. Their use as an instrument of 
regional protection for economies that are in a state of stagnation or recession 
and represent a potential obstacle to globalisation, has been overcome by the 
favourable effects resulting from the gradual attempts made by many national 
economies to remove impediments to the mobility of economic flows, stimulate 
competition, introduce legislative reforms and standardise policies (potentially 
reducing the number of organisations in the world that have sovereign control over 
economic policy)5.  
As was the case with many aspects of globalisation, the processes of re-
gional economic integration fundamentally began in the period immediately after 
the Second World War and have increased in intensity over the last few decades. 
However, the organisations and mechanisms that have typically acted as the 
driving forces behind the two processes are quite distinct: as Oman (1994, 16) 
says, in the first case the process is fundamentally microeconomic in nature, 
whereas the second process is basically political. We shall return to this question 
once more in section 3.4.  
                                            
4 Naturally over recent years it has been possible, in certain aspects, to see distinct patterns in international flows, denoting 
alterations in the relative importance of the factors or resources that lie behind the integration processes. If the formation of 
the contemporary world economy was fundamentally based on the revolution taking place in the transport system and was 
expressed more than anything else in the greater integration of commodity markets, in the last few decades It has been the 
fall In the price of communications, more than the fall in the price of transports, that has been the driving force behind th e 
greater integration of markets, and of the financial and services markets in particular. 
5 It should be noted that, according to the available data, these supranational spaces are largely responsible for the 
intensification of the international flows recorded towards the end of this century, and particularly for the rapid integration of 
the so-called emerging markets [Bowles & Maclean (1997, 183-197)]. 
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It should, however, be noted that, strictly speaking, no process of economic 
integration has yet been completed, unless one takes into account the processes 
of economic unification that took place in the nineteenth century, a fact that 
similarly underlines the resistance of the national economy to any attempts made 
to reduce its particular importance. 
 
3.4 - A new economic system 
  
With the advent of MEG, evident changes were made to the organisation 
and functioning of the economy. On the one hand, there was an overwhelming 
predominance of specialised economic units at the functional and sectoral levels 
of production, whilst on the other hand there was a predominance of capitalist 
trade based on the specialisation in production between distinct economic units, 
particularly in the form of private enterprise, in detriment to self-consumption, and 
a predominance of the market as a form of economic regulation in detriment to 
routine and the more or less all-inclusive forms of command — see Nunes & 
Valerio (1995, 47-60). There were also situations, at the level of national spaces, 
where socialist trade was based on the specialisation in production between 
distinct economic units, particularly in the form of state or public enterprise, and 
where centralised planning, as a form of regulation, prevailed over both routine 
and market forces. However, this way of organising and operating the economy, 
which is currently being rapidly dismantled, has never prevailed at the level of the 
contemporary world economy.  
It is this aspect which lies at the centre of the two controversial questions 
relating to national economies that still remain unanswered from the previous 
section: firstly that of the possible existence at the present moment of a global 
logic of production systems closely linked to a new and specific type of economic 
unit; secondly that of the limits imposed on the use made of the traditional 
instruments of economic policy by national states, or, in a more general sense, on 
their intervention in the economy, which Is connected to different forms of 
economic regulation. Although these two aspects are interrelated, we shall look at 
them separately.  
The typical economic units of the globalisation process are the 
multinational companies. These are the great driving forces behind the processes 
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of economic integration, namely the mobility and expansion of the flows of goods 
(roughly V3 of international trade corresponds to trade between multinational 
companies) and capital, especially from direct foreign investment and technology 
[The Economist (22-11-97). Their enormous flexibility in being able to alter the 
location of their productive activity at a worldwide level means that they are 
perfectly suited to the changes taking place in the systems of production as we 
near the end of this century. Strictly speaking, their powerful expansion began at 
the beginning of the 1960's, even though the 1920's were important for their 
maturation and diversification and despite the fact that in several sectors they had 
already begun lo be formed from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. Naturally, 
there have been alterations in the technical means at their disposal (particularly 
communications), just as there have been changes in the sectors in which their 
activity has most increased (services), in the spaces into which most of them have 
expanded their production networks (new industrialised countries or emerging 
markets) and even in their internal organisation (flexibilisation). Nonetheless, the 
reasons for their expansion at the end of this century are no different from the 
causes which led to their emergence and expansion some decades before. It 
should, however, be stressed that multinational companies are essentially 
complex economic units, with functional and sectoral specialisation in the sort of 
productions that are typical of the age of MEG and that have not managed to free 
themselves from a particular national identity. On average, roughly % of the assets 
of multinational companies are to be found in the country of origin, % of their 
production is obtained in the national space of the company's origin with 2/3 of 
native employees. There are therefore no genuinely transnational companies as 
yet, i. e. ones that do not have any evident national connection, with an 
internationalised management and not subject to or protected by national 
regulations [Hirst & Thompson (1996, 19-20)].  
Many people see the activities of multinational companies, and particularly 
their involvement in direct foreign investment, as the most important factor for 
restricting the scope and power of national states to intervene in the economy 
and, generally speaking, for reducing the importance of national economies. This 
trend, which is expressed in the strengthening of the market as the mechanism for 
regulating the economy, is naturally linked [Kornai (1990)] to the increase in 
private property and the liberalisation of both trade and capital movements. In this 
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context, the question of analysing whether there has been disruption or continuity 
in the economic system can be seen from two angles.  
On the one hand, these facts may be seen as being in keeping with what 
was said earlier about the age of MEG and the functioning of the contemporary 
world economy, as a capitalist world-economy: the predominance of the capitalist 
market system, in spite of the adaptations that have been made in an attempt to 
turn the system into a mixed economy with a regulated market system [Nunes & 
Valerio (1997, 172-173)] and even despite the challenge presented by a centrally-
managed socialist system at the level of a number of national economies until the 
end of the 1980's [Nunes (1997)] and, except for the inter-war period, the 
increasing openness of national economies to foreign investment.  
On the other hand, it seems clear that most of the essential features of the 
regulated market mixed economy system, which differentiate it from the capitalist 
market system and have become crystallized in the form of massive slate 
participation and interference in the regulation of economic activity, would seem 
to persist despite the widespread changes begun almost two decades ago.  
In both these cases, the main question lies in assessing the recent 
evolution in the role played by the state in the economy, both in the neo-liberal 
context and in view of the globalisation process that has characterised this period. 
This subject has in fact already been analysed in great detail, and on countless 
occasions, both at a national and international level.  
The starting point for these analyses is the fact that globalisation expands 
the market's power and sphere of action, whilst at the same time reducing the 
government's effective capacity to intervene in economic activity, since this is now 
clearly both counterproductive and risky. Labour regulations or other forms of 
control and increased taxation lead to reductions in the external competitiveness 
of some sectors and consequently to unemployment or the transfer of production 
activities and factors to other spaces. Attempts to implement social programmes 
give rise to levels of expenditure that in turn lead to an increase in interest rates 
and even serious exchange-rate problems.  
Some analyses [Pelagidis (1996)] have, however, shown that the influence 
of the state on the economy has continued to increase even in those countries 
that have made most attempts at deregulation. This is what happens when we 
take as indicators the proportion of the GDP that is represented by total public 
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expenditure, the final consumption of public administrations or social security 
transfers. At the same time, the relative importance of taxation has changed very 
little, despite alterations to the structure, namely the increase in individual income 
tax in comparison with corporation tax. This situation reflects the fact that the 
mobility of the factors of production, particularly labour, is much lower than the 
most enthusiastic supporters of the global age would like it to be.  
Although they recognise that the twentieth-century tendency for the state to 
play a much greater role in the economy is now being reversed, other 
commentators [Lipsey (1997)] underline that this changing trend is due to the 
voluntary and conscious attitude of the state itself, in view of its understanding of 
the fact that those systems in which there was a high level of state 
interventionism failed to find a rapid solution to the problems of the economic 
recession of the 1970's. In principle, therefore, deregulation was connected to the 
economic policy of national states, rather than resulting from identical effects that 
might possibly have been caused by globalisation.  
It should, however, be noted that technological innovations helped to bring 
about organisational innovations that have since reduced the so-called 
imperfections of the market and indirectly allowed for a decrease in the level of 
direct state involvement in production and distribution in classical situations of 
state intervention. This is reflected in particular in the lower number of public 
goods and the lower number of situations of natural monopoly. However, in 
contrast to this, other classical forms of state intervention seem to have increased 
in importance, particularly the management of collective resources.  
As far as the liberalisation of trade is concerned, it seems clear that this 
was basically the result of multilateral agreements made between the different 
national slates under the auspices of supranational institutions and organisations. 
Even in ihose financial markets in which globalisation has been taken too far, 
such moves only came about as a result of institutional decisions taken by 
national states, namely with the decision to put an end to the control of capital 
movements that progressively spread out from Great Britain from 1979 onwards.  
Everybody is, however, in agreement with regard to two particular aspects. 
Firstly, liberalisation and the new developments in communication and 
information technology have reduced and effectively restricted the state's power 
to intervene as a regulator. Secondly, these have always led to imbalances 
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whenever there are different rates of development, or even a contradiction in 
liberalisation measures, particularly capital flows, and other institutional and 
regulatory aspects. Examples of this are provided by the European monetary crisis 
that broke out in 1992-3 after attempts had been made to fix exchange rates 
under the EMS, or the recent financial crises in South East Asia. More than the 
behaviour of the multinational companies, it was «virtual money» alone (Drucker 
(1997)] that reduced the continuing importance of national spaces in the context 
of the world economy. As far as macroeconomic policies are concerned, namely 
monetary and budgetary policies, their implementation has been made more 
complicated and sensitive due to the real power of «virtual money», but essentially 
the basic principles for their application remain the same [The Economist (6-12-
97)].  
Even so, there are many commentators [Lipsey (1997) and Adda (1997)] 
who recognise that the organisational and regulatory power of the national state 
has remained particularly important throughout this phase and is expected to 
continue to do so in the more or less immediate future, although such power will 
be redirected towards creating a suitable environment in which economic units 
can function, with a view to attracting resources to the national space and helping 
to maintain competitiveness, towards strengthening the management of collective 
resources and towards providing incentives for the training of human capital and 
technological changes (especially for those who defend the endogenous nature of 
these changes). In other words, there should be a reinforcement of one of the 
major roles that the state has played since the end of the last century, namely 
ensuring the existence of the conditions for a high rate of growth of the national 
economy within an international context [Gerschenkron (1966)].  
Finally, it should be underlined that international coordination continues to 
be effected by means of agreements that have themselves been reached only with 
some difficulty between the large national economies. Not even the institutionally 
most advanced supranational spaces have managed to create their own 
sovereignties in detriment to the sovereignty of the national spaces that comprise 
them. Even when the small countries lose their capacity to impose their own 
autonomous economic policy and only oversee its general coordination In keeping 
with the policy of other countries, there is nonetheless a parallel reinforcement of 
nationalism and the national state remains, or is seen, as a cultural and even 
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political safeguard, and a source of protection against the economic and social 
effects of globalisation [Streeck (1997)].  
It is therefore possible to consider that, despite the importance of 
privatisation processes, the regulated market mixed economy system (in which the 
economic units of private enterprise have always tended to predominate) will 
continue to exist under essentially its present form until the end of the century. 
 
4 - Is globalisation a new phase of modern economic growth? 
  
The question as to whether globalisation represents a possible new phase 
in the age of MEG arises from the fact that phases of greater or lesser dynamism 
have been detected in the trend towards a sustained and rapid rise in the average 
standard of living, which was identified earlier as the primary feature of MEG. 
Although some commentators reject the idea that such fluctuations are cyclical in 
nature, others consider that the variations in economic activity throughout MEG 
can be identified as being part of a succession of cyclical movements of variable 
length, each of which is composed of alternate phases that express distinct 
positions in relation to the trend.  
In a very simplified form, it will be possible to detect a phase A and a phase 
B, in which the real position of the movement is respectively above and below the 
trend. Phase A can then be broken down into a sub-phase of expansion in which 
the periodic movement tends to be away from the trend and a sub-phase of 
recession in which it draws closer to the trend, whereas phase B can be broken 
down into a phase of depression in which the movement tends to be away from 
the trend and a phase of recovery in which it moves closer to the trend. For a 
possible reply to the question asked, attention is drawn to the so-called 
Kondratieff cycles with a time period of roughly 50-55 years. Finally, a reference 
should be made here to, amongst others, Schumpeter's theory for explaining the 
occurrence of these fluctuations and long-term development: technological, 
organisational, institutional and geographical innovations, their tendency to occur 
in clusters and the chain of innovation-spread-exhaustion; alterations in the 
nature of demand that is partly caused by such fluctuations. A modern version of 




It is now possible to reformulate the question: is globalisation the process 
that is inherent in the beginning of a phase A of a fifth Kondratieff cycle that 
historical analysis has envisaged for the turn of the century?  
The affirmative answer to this question was implied throughout sections 2 
and 3, so that we shall now limit ourselves to providing a systematic framework for 
looking at some of the more relevant arguments. 
 
4.1 - Technological and organisational changes 
 
It is not disputed that the last two and a half decades initially corresponded 
in a situation of a significant slowdown in growth and a destructuring of the 
organisational and even institutional aspects on which the high rate of post-war 
ijrowth had been based, followed by a more recent period in which «embryonary 
lochnology» [Lipsey & Carlow (1996)] spreads rapidly as improvements are 
introduced and new applications developed. Nor is it difficult to recognise that this 
period corresponds to a phase of «profound structural adjustment" in which 
productivity increases have continued to be slow and fluctuating, precisely 
because organisational, institutional and social changes have themselves been 
relatively slow and have become unsuitable for receiving and absorbing rapid 
technological changes. For those who accept the cyclical analysis, this phase 
corresponds to the phase of recovery in the economic cycle mentioned above 
[Nunes & Valerio (1995, 110-111)]. In concrete terms, microelectronics and 
optical libres represent an «embryonary technology" that is fast developing into a 
genuine technological revolution whose main nucleus is to be found in the 
communications sector.  
Organisational changes, namely the more flexible system of production that 
is being created both within the economic unit itself and between economic units 
nnd which was also referred to in section 1, have more or less kept pace with 
technological changes in both national and sectoral terms. Their effects upon the 
markets in the factors of production, where there has been a similar llexibilisation 
of the structure, have caused Imbalances that it is difficult to control, loading to 
impacts that are socially and psychologically disturbing and also negative in the 
short term, although such effects cannot be analysed any further here in view of 
the limited scope of this paper. On the other hand, these organisational changes 
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also involve changes in those sectors that are subject to economies of scale 
[Lipsey (1997)]. As has generally been seen in historical terms, it is those sectors 
in which technical innovation is most commonly found that tend to benefit from 
economies of scale. Currently, this is in fact the case with services, whilst the 
consumer goods industry has, on the other hand, tended to benefit from 
economies of scope. 
 
4.2 - Institutional and spatial changes. The international economic order 
 
The institutional and spatial changes that have accompanied technological 
changes, even though they may not always have kept pace with them, represent 
what in general terms may be referred to as the international economic order. We 
suggested above that, in a similar fashion to what happened in the inter-war 
period (in cyclical terms corresponding to phase B of the fourth Kondratieff oycle) 
the last quarter of the century corresponds to a phase in which the previous 
economic order, which had facilitated the economically efficient use of the last 
cluster of innovations in the period after the Second World War, was dismantled 
and in which new institutions were sought that would be capable of providing the 
necessary framework for a new phase of rapid economic growth.  
We also stressed that this demand for new institutions was based on the 
decisive performance of the national spaces. On the one hand, it was within these 
spaces that the economic systems were redefined and adapted in a general pro-
liberal framework, despite important national differences6. On the other hand, 
they were also responsible, albeit with a certain amount of difficulty, for choosing 
and directing the gradual opening up of their economies to the external market, by 
reformulating, strengthening and creating the organisations and institutions that 
provide the necessary framework for the globalisation process to take place at a 
supra-national level, both in regional and worldwide terms.  
At the monetary level, the deepening and widening of the processes of 
economic integration, occurring at various speeds and with varying degrees of 
formality, led to attempts to standardise regional economic policies and the 
                                            
6 Attention is drawn here to the processes of transition of the centrally-managed socialist economies and also of those Asian 




establishment of a system of fixed exchange rates, which in Europe itself has 
taken on an even more formal structure. At the international level, the end of the 
Bretton Woods International Monetary System resulted in the setting up of a 
system of floating exchange rates controlled through cooperation between the 
central banks, particularly those of the dominant economies at a regional level — 
the USA, FRG and Japan— the deregulation of the financial markets and the 
maintenance of the IMF, which is linked to the spread of stabilisation policies in a 
neo-liberal context.  
At the international level, the completion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, 
and particularly the replacement of the GATT agreement with an organisation such 
as the WTO, represented a significant step towards reducing protectionist 
systems, especially the non-tariff ones, which had been current practice until then, 
widening the scope of application of the different agreements and increasing their 
capacity for the arbitration of conflicts. Within this context, it is hoped that it will be 
possible to control the application of unilateral sanctions which the USA and the 
EEC/EU in particular have tended to implement more and more towards the end of 
this century.  
It should be noted that the return to a general multilateralism and the clear 
definition of the rules of the monetary and financial system do not yet seem to 
have been consolidated, reinforcing the idea that the international economic 
order, which will probably continue to pursue a high level of economic growth 
based on the full development of technological and organisational innovations, 
still requires further stabilisation and that we now find ourselves in a phase of 
recovery in cyclical terms.  
In a rather similar fashion to events in corresponding phases of earlier 
cycles, the spatial changes that are taking place as we draw closer to the end of 
this century are to be seen in the expansion of MEG into new spaces and ihe 
greater integration of certain spaces in the contemporary world economy. The 
consequences of these changes also essentially confirm the results of previous 
historical processes. Changes are taking place in specialization/complementarity, 
competition between national economies and consequently in the hierarchical 
structure and hegemony existing within the world economy.  
In fact, the transitional processes in the overwhelming majority of the 
centrally-managed socialist economies, which, since the end of the last decade, 
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have involved a significant part of the world's economic spaces, represent an 
important deepening of world economic integration. They have also meant the 
introduction of liberal pro-market reforms, a sudden opening up to external 
markets, a speeding up of the tertiarisation of economic structures and a 
convergence of cultural patterns, particularly the patterns of consumption.  
As for the spread and maturation of MEG in the so-called NIC's, or 
emerging markets, the models of economic growth and the actions of the 
respective states were a fairly exact expression of neo-liberal economic ideas and, 
in actual practice, represented the clearest possible demonstrations of 
globalisation.  
It is not within the scope of this paper to analyse the consequences of the 
institutional and spatial restructuring currently in progress, which for some 
commentators represents the true meaning of the expression "international 
oconomic order»7. We should perhaps limit ourselves to stressing that, in view of 
the strengthening of relations between developed countries and the trends 
towards a multipolarity at the centre of the present world-economy, which is a 
typical characteristic of a phase in which the world-economy is being restructured, 
Ihe declining American hegemony continues to be supported by new mechanisms 
that have somehow made it possible for its influence to continue. These 
mechanisms are basically related to strictly economic aspects, but the new 
technologies linked to the increasing domination of the English language (which Is 
the language used by those two countries which have successively been the 
dominant spaces during the age of MEG) have now added an important 






                                            
7 There have been several historical analyses of the evolution of the relations (of economic power) and the hierarchical 
structure of the national spaces comprising the contemporary world ttcnnomy up to the present moment, and these studies 
have made it possible to identify the disruptions and continuities in this phase. Adda (1997) is a good example of such a 
synthesis; Knnnedy (1988), Oman (1994) and UNRISH (1995) are also important references in this area. 
 
8 We should, for example, refer here to the great number of American programmes that IIHII be seen on televisions worldwide 




5 – Conclusion 
 
The globalisation process does not correspond to a new economic age but 
simply to yet one more phase in the present economic age. In concrete terms, this 
Is the age that is engaged in preparing for the third industrial revolution; in terms of 
cyclical analysis, it is the recovery phase of the fourth Kondratieff cycle, which will 
continue into the expansion phase of the fifth Kondratieff cycle.  
As in the corresponding phases of previous cycles, namely those occurring at 
the end of the nineteenth century and in the 1930's, fresh processes are being 
introduced for technological, organisational, institutional and spatial destructuring, 
almost always being implemented in a disproportionate and uneven fashion, 
leading to an increase in social and regional inequality, serious social disturbances, 
an exacerbation of nationalist sentiments, a struggle for economic dominance, as 
well as the creation of new economic and social ideas for solving the problems that 
have arisen. Two factors intensify the apparently even greater drama of events as 
we draw towards the end of this century: the fact that we are actually living through 
these disturbances now and the more than 120 satellites that make it possible for 
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